Creating the Office of Homeland Security - President George W. Bush
Shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. left thousands of innocent people dead, President Bush stated he would establish a Cabinet-Level office charged with "the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks." The following executive order, issued on Oct. 8, 2001 establishes that office, the Office of Homeland Security. Also on October 8, former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was sworn in as the first secretary of the new Cabinet-level agency. The Office of Homeland Security will coordinate and oversee the terrorism preparedness and prevention efforts and budgets of over 40 federal agencies.
Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 8, 2001. Executive Order
Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Establishment. I hereby establish within the Executive Office of the President an Office of Homeland Security (the "Office") to be headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.
Sec. 2. Mission. The mission of the Office shall be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office shall perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission, including the functions specified in section 3 of this order.
Sec. 3. Functions. The functions of the Office shall be to coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.
Executive Order - Office of Homeland Security
usgovinfo.about.com/library/bills/bleohomeland.htm
Bush originator of TARP
This was a George Bush program. It was signed into law on Oct. 3, 2008. On Dec. 19, 2008, then President Bush, signed an executive order to declare that TARP funds could be spent on any program he personally deemed necessary. The law was passed by a Democratically controlled congress, but 34 Senate Republicans and 91 House Republicans voted for the bill. This included the man who wants to be the next Speaker of the House, John Boehner.
I refer specifically to the bank bailout better known as TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program). This was not a President Obama program. This was a George Bush program
Florida Sun Sentinel October 4, 2010
On November 12, 2008, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson indicated that reviving the securitization market for consumer credit would be a new priority in the second allotment.[15][16]
On December 19, 2008, President Bush used his executive authority to declare that TARP funds may be spent on any program that Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson,[17] deemed necessary to alleviate the financial crisis.
On December 31, 2008, the Treasury issued a report reviewing Section 102, the Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund, also known as the "Asset Guarantee Program." The report indicated that the program would likely not be made "widely available.
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is a program of the United States government to purchase assets and equity from financial institutions to strengthen its financial sector that was signed into law by U.S. President George W. Bush on October 3, 2008. It was a component of the government's measures in 2008 to address the subprime mortgage crisis.
The TARP program originally authorized expenditures of $700 billion. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act reduced the amount authorized to $475 billion. By March 28, 2012, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated that total disbursements would be $431 billion and estimated the total cost, including grants for mortgage programs that have not yet been made, would be $32 billion.[1] This is significantly less than the taxpayers' cost of the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s but does not include the cost of other "bailout" programs (such as the Federal Reserve's Maiden Lane Transactions and the Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). The cost of the former crisis amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP during the Reagan/Bush era, while the GDP percentage of the latter crisis' cost is estimated at less than 1 percent.[2]
In the original plan presented by Secretary Paulson, the government would buy troubled (toxic) assets in insolvent banks and then sell them at auction to private investor and/or companies. This plan was scratched when Paulson met with United Kingdom's Prime Minister Gordon Brown who came to the White House for an international summit on the global credit crisis.[citation needed] George Soros claims he had language inserted into the bill at the last minute which permitted this, then once the bill was passed and signed, lobbied for the changes that occurred.[13][14] Prime Minister Brown, in an attempt to mitigate the credit squeeze in England, merely infused capital into banks via preferred stock in order to clean up their balance sheets and, in some economists' view, effectively nationalizing many banks. This plan seemed attractive to Secretary Paulson in that it was relatively easier and seemingly boosted lending more quickly. The first half of the asset purchases may not be effective in getting banks to lend again because they were reluctant to risk lending as before with low lending standards. To make matters worse, overnight lending to other banks came to a relative halt because banks did not trust each other to be prudent with their money.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troubled_Asset_Relief_Program
www.archives.gov › Federal Register › Executive Orders
Showing posts with label tarp. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tarp. Show all posts
Monday, September 17, 2012
Tuesday, July 31, 2012
FHFA Opts to Reject Principal Reductions encouraging Enterprise short sales programs
| David Dayen Tuesday July 31, 2012 11:41 am | |
I was wondering whether FHFA Acting Director Ed DeMarco would respond to that Wall Street Journal article today pressuring him to allow participation from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in an Administration principal reduction program. Well, he has. DeMarco rejected participation for Fannie and Freddie, opting to go ahead with principal forbearance and other loan modification programs and blocking principal reduction. Here’s the entire statement:
The assumptions that went into the modeling look pretty low to me, and the alleged “costliness” of implementing the principal reduction program wildly overblown. Finally, DeMarco trotted out that moral hazard argument again, saying that homeowners will “strategically default” to get eligible for a modification. I’ve already explained that no homeowner will operate on the expectation of goodwill from a servicer by putting themselves in a vulnerable position to lose their home. It just won’t happen. The modeling done here is informed by ideology, not facts.
Hilariously, FHFA announced a separate initiative with the Treasury Department to streamline short sales, which of course are a form of principal reduction (the borrower sells the house at a price lower than what they owe on the mortgage, and the mortgage holder forgives the balance).
Tim Geithner fired off an angry letter to DeMarco today, asking him to reconsider on barring principal reductions. Geithner accused DeMarco of using “selective numbers” in the FHFA analysis.
More from Nick Timiraos. If Treasury and the Administration really don’t like what DeMarco’s done here, they probably have options for dismissal. But I wouldn’t expect that.
I will again preview the fact that principal reductions will do absolutely nothing and in fact be counter-productive if Congress doesn’t extend the law that allows them to be excluded from gross income for tax purposes. More on that to come.
UPDATE: Rep. Brad Miller responds:
FHFA also released their correspondence to members of Congress over this issue, and a paper explaining their rationale. But you can boil it down to this: DeMarco doesn’t like principal reductions. The analysis showed pretty clearly that Fannie and Freddie would benefit financially from the program, because of the reduction in the likelihood of defaults after principal reductions. Homeowners would benefit in terms of saving their homes. TARP money which has already been authorized would go toward its intended purpose. But DeMarco inserted himself as executor of all housing programs with that turn of phrase “and minimize the expense of such assistance to taxpayers.” He now considers himself the guardian of TARP funds, not just GSE funds, and he did not accept the argument that shifting losses from the GSEs to TARP represented a net positive for his bottom line. DeMarco says that explicitly in this letter to the Senate Banking Committee:Today, I provided a response to numerous congressional inquiries as to whether the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) would direct Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to implement the Home Affordable Modification Program Principal Reduction Alternative (HAMP PRA). After extensive analysis of the revised HAMP PRA, including the determination by the Treasury Department to begin using Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) monies to make incentive payments to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FHFA has concluded that the anticipated benefits do not outweigh the costs and risks. Given our multiple responsibilities to conserve the assets of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, maximize assistance to homeowners to avoid foreclosures, and minimize the expense of such assistance to taxpayers, FHFA concluded that HAMP PRA did not clearly improve foreclosure avoidance while reducing costs to taxpayers relative to the approaches in place today.
I have also previewed for Congress several housing-related initiatives to strengthen the loss mitigation and borrower assistance efforts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as improve the operation of the housing finance market. These initiatives include new and consistent policies for lender representations and warranties, alignment and simplification of the Enterprise short sales programs, and further enhancements for borrowers looking to refinance their mortgages.
Who’s business is it of Ed DeMarco to fret about the cost of TARP? TARP has a mandate of mitigating foreclosures and helping homeowners. DeMarco seems to think that his mandate is to protect the taxpayer across the whole of government. And he’s just wrong about that.The results of this analysis that are most favorable to employing principal forgiveness demonstrated that implementing HAMP PRA may result in approximately 74,000 to 248,000 borrowers being eligible for principal reduction modifications (based on a range of plausible take-up rates) at a positive financial benefit to the Enterprises. However, nearly all of this benefit is simply a transfer from taxpayers to the Enterprises, which would add to the over $188 billion in taxpayer support the Enterprises have already received. Under other reasonable
assumptions, implementing HAMP PRA would actually increase taxpayer costs.
The assumptions that went into the modeling look pretty low to me, and the alleged “costliness” of implementing the principal reduction program wildly overblown. Finally, DeMarco trotted out that moral hazard argument again, saying that homeowners will “strategically default” to get eligible for a modification. I’ve already explained that no homeowner will operate on the expectation of goodwill from a servicer by putting themselves in a vulnerable position to lose their home. It just won’t happen. The modeling done here is informed by ideology, not facts.
Hilariously, FHFA announced a separate initiative with the Treasury Department to streamline short sales, which of course are a form of principal reduction (the borrower sells the house at a price lower than what they owe on the mortgage, and the mortgage holder forgives the balance).
Tim Geithner fired off an angry letter to DeMarco today, asking him to reconsider on barring principal reductions. Geithner accused DeMarco of using “selective numbers” in the FHFA analysis.
More from Nick Timiraos. If Treasury and the Administration really don’t like what DeMarco’s done here, they probably have options for dismissal. But I wouldn’t expect that.
I will again preview the fact that principal reductions will do absolutely nothing and in fact be counter-productive if Congress doesn’t extend the law that allows them to be excluded from gross income for tax purposes. More on that to come.
UPDATE: Rep. Brad Miller responds:
“I join Secretary Geithner in urging that FHFA reconsider the decision to continue to refuse any principal reduction in Fannie’s and Freddie’s loan modification program. FHFA’s own analysis shows that targeted principal reductions would save taxpayers money as well as help many homeowners avoid foreclosure.
We are five years into the housing crisis, and FHFA remains paralyzed by the fear that somehow homeowners innocently trapped in the worst economy since the Great Depression are going to weasel out of paying every penny on their mortgage that they could. More than any private business or government agency, FHFA has the economic and legal power to break the cycle of declining home values and foreclosures that has stunted economic recovery, and has consistently failed to exercise that power with the imagination and urgency required.”
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